REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT

MANILA

SECOND (2^ND)DIVISION

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS A S S O C I A T I O N (TMPCWA), ED CUBELO, ET. AL.,

Petitioners.

-versus- G. R. CASE NOS. 158786 & 158789

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, ET.AL.,

Respondents.

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TOYOTA MOTOR PHIL. CORP.,

. Petitioner,

-versus- G.R. CASE NOS. 158798-99

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP.

WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA),

Respondent.

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MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION

WITH PRAYER THAT THIS BE RESOLVED BY

THE HON. SUPREME COURT EN BANC

The Petitioners TMPCWA ET.AL. by Counsel come to this Honorable Supreme Court and respectfully moves for the reconsideration of its October 19, 2007 decision (received on November 9, 2007) based on the following:

- A -

PREFATORY STATEMENT

The October 19, 2007 decision of the Hon. Court has a “chilling effect” coming at a time when great strides are being made in Human Rights protection with the institutionalization of the writ of Amparo. It is two giant steps backward in labor jurisprudence, without any light, or the possibility for a one step forward thence. It overturned, drastically modified or altered existing jurisprudential laws and doctrines on the constitutional rights to strike and freedom of expression, and the principles on hierarchy of constitutional rights as against the right to profit - coming at a period of this country’s history after martial law was supposedly dismantled, and the enforcement of the 1987 constitution- it is most respectfully submitted.

The thought applied by the Hon. Court to rationalize its October 19, 2007 decision, in page 48: “…Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargaining tools, it is an antiquated notion that they are truly beneficial, as they only provide short-term solutions by forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes would damage the working relationship between employers and employees, thus endangering the business that they both want to succeed. The more progressive and truly effective means of dispute resolution, lies in mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, which do not increase tension but instead provide relief from them. In the end, an atmosphere of trust and understanding has much more to offer a business relationship than the traditional enmity that has long divided the employer and the employee,”

-with due respect, is an archaic thought that has been thrown away in the dustbin of history with the advent of constitutionalism. Its resurrection in the Hon. Court’s October 19, 2007 decision reverses and modifies the prevailing thought in the case of Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. (BIMCAI) et.al.. versus National Labor Relations Commission, et.al. G.R. NO. 105090, September 16, 1993 (This Division) as eloquently penned by no less than the Chief Justice, (then Justice) the Hon. Reynato Puno and is quoted extensively:

“The restoration of the right to strike is the most valuable gain of labor after the EDSA Revolution. It is the employees sole weapon which can effectively protect their basic rights especially in a society where the levers of powers are nearly monopolized by the propertied few or their franchises. In recognition of its importance, our constitution has accorded the right to strike a distinct status while our laws have assured that its rightful exercise will not be negated by the issuance of unnecessary inunctions. x x x”

x x x

“Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. It may be that in highly developed countries, the significance of strike as a coercive weapon has shrunk in view of the preference for more peaceful modes of settling labor disputes. In underdeveloped countries, however, where the economic crunch continues to enfeeble the already marginalized working class, the importance of the right to strike remains undiminished as indeed it has proved many a time as the only coercive weapon that can correct abuses against labor. It remains as the great equalizer.” (emphasis supplied)

“In the Philippine milieu where social justice remains more as a rhetoric than a reality, labor has vigilantly fought to safeguard the sanctity of the right to strike. Its struggle to gain the right to strike has not been easy and effortless. Labor’s early exercise of the right to strike collided with the laws on rebellion and sedition and sent its leaders languishing in prisons. The specter of incarceration did not spur its leaders to sloth; on the contrary it spiked labor to work for its legitimization. This effort was enhanced by the flowering of liberal ideas in the United States which inevitably crossed our shores. It was enormously boosted by

the American occupation of our country. Hence, on June 17, 1953, Congress gave statutory recognition to the right to strike when it enacted RA 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. For nearly two (2) decades, lab or enjoyed the right to strike until it was prohibited on September 12, 1972 upon the declaration of martial law in the country. The 14- year battle to end martial rule produced many martyrs and foremost among them were the radicals of the labor movement. It was not a mere happenstance, therefore, that after the final battle against martial rule was fought at EDSA in 1986, the new government treated labor with a favored eye. Among those chosen by then President Corazon C. Aquino to draft the 1987 Constitution were recognized labor leaders like Eulogio Lerum, Jose D. Calderon, Blas D. Ople and Jaime S. L. Tadeo. These delegates helped craft into the 1987 Constitution its Article XIII entitled Social Justice and Human Rights. For the first time in our constitutional history, the fundamental law of our land mandated the State to “… guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.” This constitutional imprimatur given to the right to strike constitutes signal victory for labor. Our Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 did not accord constitutional status to the right to strike. Even the liberal US Federal Constitution did not elevate the right to strike to a constitutional level. With a constitutional matrix, enactment of a law implementing the right to strike was an inevitability. RA 6715 came into being on March 21, 1989, an intentional replication of RA 875. In the light of the genesis of the right to strike, it ought to be obvious that the right should be read with a libertarian latitude in favor of labor. x x x”

Much more, the fear of capital and the Hon. Court that workers might exercise their constitutional right to freedom of expression more too often, and absent themselves from work and affect production and in worse scenario use this as a disguise for strike by workers in general is not sufficient ground to abridge the Toyota workers constitutional right to freedom of expression and mass dismissing them for participating in a rally infront of DOLE and BLR by considering it an illegal “strike in disguise”.

Confronting this similar fear of the masses, the Court through the libertarian concurring opinion of then, Justice Claudio Teehankee also quoting Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California in the case of Jose B.L. Reyes versus Ramon Bagatsing G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983 [En banc], resonated and quote:

“Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one * * *.

“Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. * * *

“Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential (for) effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. * * * The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. Among freemen the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly. (Emphasis supplied)”

No serious evil resulted from these February 22 & 23, 2001 rally. There was no violence, no riot, it was a peaceful exercise of freedom of expression. The demonstrators peacefully, but strongly denounced the conduct of hearing at the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Department

of Labor and Employment Office in Intramuros, on appeal as improper and irregular. They denounced it as an attempt to find ways and means to justify the reversal of the decision of the Med-Arbiter certifying the Petitioner union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent after winning in the certification election. They denounced the action of government agency in taking cognizance of an appeal by Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. in a certification election, which is prohibited by law. They denounced the timing of the hearing coming at a time immediately after the dinner meeting between then Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas and Mr. George Ty of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. and others. There is no truth to the finding that the rally was staged to force Toyota to recognize TMPCWA as the bargaining agent. TMPCWA is already recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent per the decision of the Med-Arbiter which Toyota appealed from. Thus, even the reason forwarded by the Hon. Court for the demonstration was erroneous. It was not a demonstration against the Med-Arbiter. The union never claimed that the Med-Arbiter was not bias against the Union. (Annex “A” hereof affidavit of Ed Cubelo). Toyota Motor Phils Corp. suffered no financial losses, as a consequence of the two day rally. As a matter of fact for that year Toyota registered P122.4 million pesos in net profit for 2001. The year that there was an alleged illegal strike. Its Financial Statement for the year as reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission showed no losses on account and by reason of demonstration or an alleged strike. (Pls. see Annexes M” to “M-17”, of the Petition for Review on Certiorari,

Financial Statement for year 2001 before the SEC filed by Toyota Motors Phils. Corporation).

The right to freedom of expression is primary over the right to profit. So that even if in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, the employees did not report for work on February 22 & 23, 2001 and did not involve in production, and instead stage a rally at the DOLE and BLR for 2 days, the right to freedom of expression is upheld over the right to profit.

This is a well settled doctrine, in the Philippines jurisprudence as the Court ruled in the landmark case of Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization versus Philippine Blooming Mills (51 SCRA 189, 2050, and quote :

x x x

“In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution – the untrammeled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o’ clock in the morning to 2 o’clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the lift and death of the firm or its owners or its management.” x x x

“As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights-freedom of expression , of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances-over property rights has been sustained. xxx”

The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally.” x x x

-III-

“The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from service constituted an unconstitutional restraint of their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances. The respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4 (a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage in concerted activities for x x x mutual aid or protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guraranteed in Section Three.” (pp. 202-208, Phil. Blooming Mills case, 51 SCRA 189).

The exercise of this right cannot be neutralized by the simple expedient of making a distinction that there is no labor dispute at Philippine Blooming Mills case, while there is a labor dispute at the instant case, so that the doctrine laid down in the Philippine Blooming Mills case is not applicable. This is a non siquitur distinction and there is no law or jurisprudence that the mere presence of a labor dispute converts the exercise of the right to freedom of expression into a strike, indeed a strike in disguise, so as to remove the rally staged on February 22 & 23, 2001 from the protective mantle of the constitution and make it a strike to justify the mass dismissal of some 227 plus workers. It is a very strained construction that simply seeks the illegality of the acts rather than recognized the exercise of a constitutional right, it is most respectfully submitted.

Lastly, the private respondents cannot just be allowed to mass dismiss some 227 of its workers and seek the intervention of the judicial system (from the NLRC to the Courts) through Certification to compulsory arbitration (under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code for its imprimatur. As the Hon. Court held in the case of Times Transportation Co. Inc. versus National Labor Relations Commission and Times Employees Union, G.R. No.148500-01 November 29, 2006 (First Division), the Court ruled and quote:

“Petitioner cannot just unceremoniously dismiss a hundred of its employees in the absence of clear and convincing proof that these people were indeed guilty of the acts charged and then, afterwards, go to court to seek validation of the dismissal it whimsically executed. That, certainly we cannot allow. It is the duty of courts and judicial bodies to serve the ends of justice and not perpetrate injustice.”

The October 19, 2007 decision of the Hon. Supreme Court, it is respectfully submitted is unconstitutional as it infringes on the constitutional provision that “… no doctrines or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc in decision maybe modified or reversed by the Court except sitting en banc”, and additionally to wit:

1) That, an ordinary union member or employee’s mere participation in a rally later declared illegal strike is not a ground for dismissal;

2) That, a rally staged against government agency for redress of grievances requiring 2 day absence from work being declared an illegal strike, is a modification of the Philippine Blooming Mills case, the right to exercise freedom of expression cannot be qualified and restricted by the simple expedient of injecting that there is no labor dispute at Philippine Blooming Mills case while there is one in the instant case.

It is respectfully submitted that the instant Motion for Reconsideration is best referred to the Court “en banc” in view of the fundamental and compelling issues raised that only the Supreme Court, en banc has jurisdiction to resolve with finality.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION

-I-

THE OCTOBER 19, 2007 DECISION IS A COMPLETE AND TOTAL REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND FACTS WHEN IT RULED THAT: “THE FEBRUARY 22 TO 23, 2001 CONCERTED ACTIONS, THE MARCH 17 TO APRIL 12, 2001 STRIKES, AND THE MAY 23 AND 28, 2001 MASS ACTIONS WERE ILLEGAL STRIKES.

I-A

THE MARCH 28, 2001 AND APRIL 12, 2001 STRIKE WAS PERFECTLY LEGAL SO THE NLRC AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND NO ILLEGAL STRIKE WAS COMMITTED. THIS FACTUAL FINDING IS BINDING UPON THE HON. COURT.

The March 28 to April 12, 2001 strike was declared illegal by this Hon. Court mainly on the basis of the alleged commission of: illegal or prohibited acts during the strike, second paragraph, page 25, of the October 19, 2007, decision and quote:

“We respect to the strikes committed from March 17 to April 12, 2001, those were initially legal as the legal requirements were met. However, on March 28 to April 12, 2001, the Union barricaded the gates of the Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants and blocked the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. Toyota employees, customers, and other people having business with the company were intimidated and were refused entry to the plants. As earlier explained, these strikes were illegal because unlawful means were employed. The acts of the Union officers and members are in palpable violation of Art. 264(e), which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. Undeniably, the strikes from March 28 to April 12, 2001 were illegal.”

This finding is anchored almost verbation from the self-serving affidavit of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. “Head Security”. A simple reading however, of said affidavit will show that Head Security Eduardo Nicolas III did not identify the illegal acts committed by the individual strikers, all it did was to alleged general allegation that “on March 28, 2001, strikers intensified their picketing and barricaded the gates of TMPC’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants, thus blocking the free ingress/egress to and from the premises. Shuttle buses and cars containing TMPC employees, suppliers, dealers, customers, and people having business with the company, were prevented by the strikers from entering the plants.” No individual responsibility was pinpointed.

It is well settled rule in this jurisdiction as ruled in the case of Association of Independent Union in the Philippines versus National Labor Relations Commission, CENAPRO Chemical Corp., G. R. No. 120505 March 25, 1999 (Third Division) and quote:

“For the severest administrative penalty of dismissal to attach, the erring striker must be duly identified. Simply referring to them as “strikers”, “AIU strikers, complainants in this case is not enough to justify their dismissal.”

So that it is simply beyond comprehension why 227 union officers and members would be dismissed from work for participating in a legitimate strike and without their being individually identified and pinpointed for illegal acts allegedly committed during the strike.

Going further to the affidavit of Head Security Eduardo Nicolas III, he proceeded to name those strikers who were picketing at the strike area to wit:

“5. As a standard operating procedure, I instructed my men to take photographs and video footages of those who participated in the strike. Seen on video footages taken on various dates actively participating in the strike were union officers Emilio C. Completo, Alexander Esteva, Joey Javellonar and Lorenzo Caraqueo.”

“6. Based on the pictures, among those identified to have participated in the March 28, 2001 strike were Grant Robert Toral, John Posadas, Alex Sierra, Allan John Malabanan, Abel Bersos, Ernesto Bonavente, Ariel Garcia, Pablito Adaya, Feliciano Mercado, Charlie Oliveria, Philip Roxas, June Lamberte, Manjolito Puno, Baldwin San Pablo, Joseph Naguit, Federico Torres, Larry Gerola, Roderick Bayani, Allan Oclarino, Reynaldo Cuevas, Jorge Polutan, Arman Ercillo, Jimmy Hembra, Albert Mariquit, Ramil Gecale, Jimmy Palisoc, Normandy Castalone, Joey Llanera, Greg Castro, Felicisimo Escrimadora, Rodolfo Bay, Ramon Clemente, Dante Baclino, Allan Palomares, Arturo Murillo and Robert Gonzales. Attached hereto as Annexes “1” to “18” are the pictures taken on March 28, 2001 at the Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.”

7. “From March 29 to 31, 2001, the strikers continued to barricade the entrances to TMPC’s two (2) plants. Once again, the strikers hurled nasty remarks and prevented employees abroad shuttle buses from entering the plants. Among the strikers were Christopher Saldivar, Basilio Laqui, Sabas Barnabise, Federico Torres, Freddie Olit, Josel Agosto, Arthur Parilla, Richard Calalang, Ariel Garcia, Edgar Hilaga, Charlie Oliveria, Ferdinand Jaen, Wilfredo Tagle, Alejandro Imperial, Manjolito Puno, Delmar Espadilla, Domingo Javier, Apollo Violeta and Elvis Tabinao. (This affidavit is reproduced in pp. 10 and 11 of the October 19, 2007 decision)

The Head Security talks only of mere participation, not commission of any illegal or prohibited acts during the strike. No individual striker was named as having committed violence, coercion, physical injuries, blocking the egress/ingress of the company.

The alleged photographs Annexes 1 to 18 of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Position Paper submitted before the NLRC does not show who was blocking and who is striker blocking of the ingress/egress, if any. All it show were the roving pickets of the strikers. The fact that it is roving could be clearly seen in the position of the pickets walking and moving in a direction that is from one point to another. The Hon. Court concedes that “Toyota presented photographs which show said employees conducting mass picket and concerted actions”, on May 18, 2001, the Court enumerated 64 participants. Not any one of them pinpointed to have committed acts of violence, intimidation, coerce, cajole or blocking any employee or person from entering or going out of the company.

There was no affidavits coming from the alleged employees, customers, clients in the public who were blocked and prevented from entering or leaving the strike area, or that they have been bad mouthed or cajoled or coerced and who among the strikers did these illegal acts.

The issuance of Injunction by the NLRC is not proof of violation of ingress and egress. It is a reiteration of law prohibiting the commission of unlawful acts at the strike area but not proof of actual commission thereof and liability of any striker. It is not a finding of guilt so as to support a finding of illegal strike.

But even assuming without admitting that some strikers committed illegal acts, then only them should be made responsible individually after being found guilty, to have done so, but not to include all of the picketers in the mass dismissal on mere general accusation.

Mere participation in a strike, specially found by the Hon. Court to have conformed with all the requirements of law is not a ground for dismissal. There is thus no legal basis to dismiss the following employees from mere participation in the March 28, 29 & 31, 2001 picket/mass action within the March 17 to April 12, 2007 strike:

1. Abel Bersos

2. Albert Mariquit

3. Alejandro Imperial

4. Alex Sierra

5. Alexander Esteva

6. Allan John Malabanan

7. Allan Oclarino

8. Allan Palomares

9. Apollo Violeta

10. Ariel Garcia

11. Arman Ercillo

12. Arthur Parilla

13. Arturo Murillo

14. Baldwin San Pablo

15. Basilio Laqui

16. Charlie Oliveria

17. Christopher Saldivar

18. Dante Baclino

19. Delmar Espadilla

20. Domingo Javier

21. Edgar Hilaga

22. Elvis Tabinao

23. Emilio C. Completo

24. Ernesto Bonavente

25. Federico Torres

26. Feliciano Mercado

27. Felicisimo Escrimadora

28. Ferdinand Jaen

29. Freddie Olit

30. Grant Robert Toral

31. Greg Castro

32. Jimmy Hembra

33. Jimmy Palisoc

34. Joey Javellonar

35. Joey Llanera

36. John Posadas

37. Jorge Polutan

38. Josel Agosto

39. Joseph Naguit

40. June Lamberte

41. Larry Gerola

42. Lorenzo Caraqueo

43. Manjolito Puno

44. Normandy Castalone

45. Pablito Adaya

46. Philip Roxas

47. Ramil Gecale

48. Ramon Clemente

49. Reynaldo Cuevas

50. Richard Calalang

51. Robert Gonzales

52. Roderick Bayani

53. Rodolfo Bay

54. Sabas Barnabise

55. Wilfredo Tagle

This is perhaps the reason why the NLRC and the Court of Appeals decisions did not find the March 28 to April 12, 2007 strike illegal, launched after complying with all the legal requirements and an unfair labor practice grounds as the mass dismissal of the entire union leadership and some 218 union members.

Lastly, jurisprudence on this point of liability for commission of illegal acts during the strike is consistent. In the case of International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 98295-99, First Division, April 10, 1996, (256 SCRA 124,134-135) ruled and quote:

“x x x

As aptly stated by the Solicitor General:

x x x

Hence, for a worker or Union member to suffer the consequence of loss of employment, he must have knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike, i.e., infliction of physical injuries, assault, breaking of truck side and windows, throwing of empty bottles at non-strikers.

The Hon. Supreme Court, in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. (INPORT) versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 103560, 103599, July 06, 1995, 245 SCRA 627, 641 ruled and quote:

that these union members committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal”.

The suspicion or accusation of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. that the strikers named may have committed of illegal acts during the strike is not justification at all for the effected dismissal. The burden of proof in illegal strike cases rest on the employer, and doubts are resolved in favor of labor. There certainly is doubt as to the actual and individual participation, if any of the ordinary union members in violence or in blocking the ingress and egress to and from the company. Such doubt must be construed infavor of the worker. In the case of Times Transportation Co. Inc. versus National Labor Relations Commission and Times Employees Union, G.R. No.148500-01 November 29, 2006 (First Division), the Court ruled and quote:

“The Law mandates that the burden of proving the validity of the termination of employment rests with the employer. Failure to discharge this evidenciary burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified, and, therefore illegal. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations and conclusions of employees do not provide for legal justification for

dismissing employees. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved in favor of labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of our labor laws and constitution.”

“Indubitably, the list submitted by the petitioner containing the names of 123 employees who allegedly participated in the second strike, including the so-called uncontested notices of termination sent to those employees, cannot be given the stature of substantial evidence, for other than they were unilaterally prepared by the petitioner and evidently self-serving, they are not

enough to convince even the unreasonable mind. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable mind might conceivably opine otherwise.” (Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 210, 230)

I-B

THE FEBRUARY 22 TO 23, 2001 CONCERTED ACTIONS WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES AND NOT AN ILLEGAL STRIKE

THE RALLY CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE HEARING WAS DIRECTED AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND ITS AGENCY NOT THE COMPANY, AS AN EXERCISE OF THE WORKERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREE ASSEMBLY AND SPEECH FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES AS RULED IN THE PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS CASE.

The fact that the February 22 and 23, 2001 rally was not against Toyota and the Union has no intent to disrupt production is best exemplified by the Union’s formal offer to work on a rest day Sunday in exchange for the day of the hearing, and to treat the said day as ordinary

working day without overtime pay. This was duly communicated in a letter to President Fukuda. [pls see Annexes “E”, “F” and “G” to “G-1”, of the Petition for Review on Certiorari].

So that there was absolutely no reason at all for the respondent Toyota (TMPC) to treat the employees absence from work on February 22 and 23, 2001 as a strike (wild cat) and dismissed them for illegal strike, as there was no strike to speak of but a demonstration directed against government instrumentality or authority and not against the Company.

The Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. (Toyota) has apparently veered away from its original theory. Earlier, it charged the 227 union officers and members of “…having joined the strike on February 21, 22 and 23…” (last sentence, page 21, Toyota’s REPLY), for three (3) days but in page 28 of the said Toyota’ REPLY, it diluted and lowered the gravamen to “…subject employees walked out of their scheduled overtime work on February 21, 2001 and refused to report or work at all, not only on February 22, 2003 but likewise on the following day February 23, 2001...” From illegal strike charge to a simple case of alleged refusal to render overtime and two day absences.

This is followed by TOYOTA’s admission in pp. 13-15 of their REPLY (quoting extensively from its alleged termination letters), that the 227 union officers and members it massed dismissed for “illegal strike,” indeed attended a clarificatory hearing before the Bureau of Labor relations on February 22 and 23, 2001, although it disagrees with this action as it argued no necessity for them to attend the said hearing and stage a rally. The relevant portion is quoted below for easy reference:

“It is significant that the absences you incurred inorder to attend the clarificatory hearing conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations were unnecessary because the union was amply represented in the said hearing by its counsel and certain members who sought and were granted leaves for the purpose. Your reason for being absent is therefore not acceptable…”

Absences (two days for February 22 & 23) under Toyota’s Code of Conduct are punishable by warning/suspension, etc. Definitely, the two (2) day absences are not punishable by dismissal. So that the dismissal of the 218 ordinary union members and some union officers for two day absences is contrary to Toyota’s own Code of Conduct. It is illegal dismissal and too harsh a penalty.

But the NLRC and Toyota with an “evil eye” (to borrow the Court’s word in Free Telephone Workers’ Union versus Blas Ople, 108 SCRA 757; Central Textile Mills Inc. Employees Union et., al. versus Blas Ople et., al. G.R. No. 62037, January 27, 1983 (120 SCRA 355) unilaterally and illegally upgraded it to illegal strike and heartlessly massed dismissed 227 Union Officers and members of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Union (TMPCWA).

This was a simple case of the workers exercising their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition government for redress of grievances. (Article III, Section 4, of the 1987 Constitution).

The Court in the landmark case of Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization versus Philippine Blooming Mills (51 SCRA 189, 205) ruled that a workers’ demonstration against public authority as the Secretary of Labor and the BLR is not a strike, and quote:

“As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights-freedom of expression , of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances-over property rights has been sustained. xxx”

-III-

NO STAGGERING FINANCIAL LOSSES

DUE TO STRIKE. NO EVIDENCE AT ALL

The finding of the National Labor Relations Commission as affirmed by the Assailed decisions of the Hon. Court of Appeals of alleged “staggering losses” due to the alleged “illegal strike,” is not even supported by Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. in its REPLY. In pages 16-17, Toyota is merely talking not of losses in amount certain but in some nebulous naked assertions of “…Toyota correspondingly failed to

assemble otherwise income generating units, and in turn, deliver on their commitments in the market. In the case of its New Revo line there occurred a scarcity of new model…” No mention whatsoever of what the

NLRC decision and affirmed by the Hon. Court of Appeals as “staggering financial losses.” Indeed there was serious error of law for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed the baseless Assailed Decision of the NLRC.

Toyota must prove that it suffered losses due to the alleged “illegal strike”. Losses are not assumed on the occasion of a strike, as the Assailed decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals and the NLRC implied. In the case of Venancio Guerrero, et. al., versus National Labor Relations Commission, R.O. H. Auto Products Phils., et. al., G. R. No. 119842, dated August 30,1996 [Second Division] 216 SCRA 301, 307, the Hon. Court ruled and quote:

“We reject respondent Company’s contention that it was not necessary to present proof of severity of losses it sustained since petitioners were aware of the strike and its adverse affects on the company’s operations. x x x

On the contrary, Toyota Motors Phils. Corporation earned P122.4 million pesos in net profit for 2001. The year that there was an alleged illegal strike. (please see Annexes “M” to “M-17”, of the Petition for Review on Certiorari, Financial Statement for year 2001 before the SEC filed by Toyota Motors Phils. Corporation).

The public respondent NLRC’s assailed decision found no illegal strike committed on the strike launched by the Union from March 28 to April 12, 2001. Toyota did not appeal from this finding before the Hon. Court of Appeals and neither did it raise issue on this in their

petition for review on certiorari. Obviously Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. agreed that there was no illegal strike or commission of prohibited activities during the March 28 to April 12, 2001 strike.

The glaring truth that there was no strike (or illegal strike) on February 22 & 23, 2001 and May 23 and May 28, 2001 contrary to the findings of the Hon. Court of Appeals and the NLRC is the fact that out

of the 227 union members it dismissed for illegal strike, some 67 were paid separation pay/financial assistance of about 1.5 months per year of service. This is an admission by private respondent Toyota that indeed there was no basis for dismissal on ground of illegal strike?

There is an offer that continue to this day of 1.5 months separation pay/financial assistance to all union members dismissed on alleged ground of illegal strike, and a blanket offer was made by private respondent to union officers to just name their price in separation pay/assistance to settle the labor dispute. For why would they offer 1.5 months pay per year of service as separation pay/financial assistance to petitioners, if the private respondents truly believe in the justness of their mass dismissal of some 227 union officers and members on alleged ground of illegal strike? For why would they offer to pay separation pay/financial assistance if indeed petitioners were dismissed for cause? As the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Judric Canning Corporation versus Inciong, 115 SCRA 887, 890 and quote:

“Offered to pay respondent union members separation pay of one (1) month. This is a clear admission of the charge of arbitrary dismissal for why should the petitioner offer to pay what it calls “severance pay” if the private respondents were not, indeed, dismissed, or if the petitioner sincerely believed in the righteousness of its stance.”

Indeed, the private respondents’ continuing offer of separation pay/financial assistance to the dismissed union members and officers is an admission that their position is untenable and it would be to their best interest to settle.

IN THE CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT TOYOTA HAS NOT EVEN FILED A CASE FOR ILLEGAL STRIKE FOR THE ALLEGED ACTS IT CONSIDERED A WILD CAT STRIKE ON FEBRUARY 22 AND 23, 2001 WHEN SOME OF ITS EMPLOYEES STAGED A DEMONSTRATION AT THE DOLE AND ATTENDED A HEARING BEFORE THE BLR.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONDONATION MUST BE APPLIED, ASSUMING THERE WAS STRIKE, WHEN THE COMPANY ACCEPTED BACK TO WORK ALL RETURNING EMPLOYEES WHO DEMONSTRATED /RALLIED/ ATTENDED HEARINGS.

The union members and officers reported for work on the next working day after attending the rally and hearing on February 22 and 23, 2001. THE TOYOTA (TMPC) ACCEPTED THEM ALL BACK TO WORK WITHOUT ANY RESERVATIONS OR PRE-CONDITIONS. THEY WORKED NORMALLY THEREAFTER.

So that even assuming for the sake of argument without admitting it , still the respondent Toyota (TMPC) condoned what it mistakenly perceived as wild cat strike when it unconditionally accepted back to work the returning workers who attended the rally and hearing on February 22 and 23, 2001.

They cannot now be penalized with respondent Toyota’s change of mind or a mere after thought to persecute them by mass dismissing them for illegal strike. This is a well settled doctrine in this jurisdiction. (Bisayan Transportation Co. versus Court of Industrial Relations, 102 Phil. 442; National Service Corp., et. al. versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 69870, November 29, 1988, EN BAN, (I68 SCRA 123).

Moreover, there was no riot, violence, etc. during the February 22, and 23 2001 demonstration as found by the Assailed decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the NLRC that it was unmarred by any form of violence or destruction of company properties. There is thus no occasion for the assailed decision to cite the company provision on riots/strikes, etc. as having been violated to justify dismissal. The Union President was not one of those issued a show cause and a Memo of Dismissal for the February 22, and 23, 2001 incident. He was not charged by the company with illegal strike yet the Commission ordered him dismissed. Indeed, a sheer grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Toyota (TMPC) is without authority to declare the two day absences used in attending the hearing and demonstration as illegal strike and dismiss 218 ordinary union members and union officers outright.

Under the Labor Code only the Labor Arbiter has the original and exclusive authority to declare an illegal strike. (Article 217 of the Labor Code).

FAILURE TO RENDER OVERTIME

ON FEBRUARY 21, 2007

Moreover, failure to render overtime work on February 21, 2007 is not a strike. There is even no showing that all of the 227 demonstrators were required to render overtime. There is no showing that factual basis exist to compel the workers to render overtime on February 21, 2007 and thus perhaps make them liable for failure to render overtime on February 21, 2007, but not a strike.

There is no evidence on record to show that the scenario envisioned in Article 89 of the Labor Code in order to compel workers to render overtime was present on February 21, 2007 and quote:

“Any employee may be required by the employer to perform overtime work in any of the following cases:

(a) When the country is at war or when any other national or local emergency has been declared by the Congress or the Chief Executive.

(b) When it is necessary to prevent loss of life or property or in case of imminent danger to public safety due to an actual or impending emergency in the locality caused by serious accidents, fire, flood, typhoon, earthquake, epidemic, or other disaster or calamity;

( c) When there is urgent work to be performed on machines, installations, or equipment, in order to avoid serious loss or damage to the employer or some other cause of similar nature;

(d) When the work is necessary to prevent loss or damage to perishable goods; and

(e) Where the completion or continuation of the work started before the eight hour is necessary to prevent serious obstruction or prejudice to the business or operations of the employer.

Any employee required to render overtime work under this Article shall be paid the additional compensation required in this Chapter.

ART. 90. Computation of additional compensation. For purposes of computing overtime and other additional remuneration as required by this Chapter the regular wage of an employee shall include the cash wage only, without deduction on account of facilities provided by the employer.”

The 227 dismissed workers cannot thus be held liable for failure to render overtime work on February 21, 2007 and declare that failure an illegal strike.

I - C

THE HON. COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT AN ILLEGAL STRIKE WAS HELD ON MAY 23, 2001 AND MAY 28, 2001 WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO WORK STOPPAGE AT ALL.

There is no legal and factual basis for the Hon. Court to declare the picket for two (hrs.) a day on May 23 and 28, 2007, done by some of the dismissed employees who were not working at Toyota Motor Phils. Corp at the time of the picket – as illegal strike. It is beyond comprehension how could the definitive meaning of a strike under the labor could be extended within a latitudinarian and unbounded import.

The Hon. Court thus found the May 23 and 28, 2007 picket as an illegal strike in its October 19, 2007 decision, page 28, middle paragraph and quote:

“While it may be conceded that there was no work disruption in the two Toyota plants, the fact still remains that the Union and its members picketed and performed concerted actions in front of the Company premises. This is a patent violation of the assumption of jurisdiction and certification Order of the DOLE Secretary, which ordered the parties “to cease and desist from committing any act that might lead to the worsening of an already deteriorated situation.” While there are no work stoppages, the pickets and concerted actions outside the plants have a demoralizing and even chilling effect on the workers inside the plants and can be considered as veiled threats of possible trouble to the workers when they go out of the company premises after work and of impending disruption of operations to company officials and even to customers in the days to come. The pictures presented by Toyota undoubtedly show that the company officials and employees are being intimidated and threatened by the strikers. In short, the Union, by its mass actions, has inflamed an already volatile situation,

which was explicitly proscribed by the DOLE Secretary’s Order. We do not find any compelling reason to reverse the NLRC findings that the pickets on May 23 and 28, 2001 were unlawful strikes.”

First. Considering that there is a finding that there was no work stoppage or what the Hon. Court term as “no work disruptions in the two Toyota plants” on May 23 and May 28, 2007, while its members picketed and performed concerted actions infront of the company. Then, it can be reasonably concluded that because of the absence of the element of Temporary work stoppage then there could be no strike within the meaning of “Strikes” under Article 212 (o) of the Labor Code and quote:

“(o) “Strike” means any Temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.”

Second. There is nothing in law that authorizes the public authorities to consider the exercise of freedom of expression as illegal strike, to an extended meaning of violation of the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

If the picketers may be held liable at all perhaps it is for failure to secure a permit to rally but certainly not for illegal strike.

This is a very dangerous ground that is being treaded, where the constitutional right to freedom of expression may be suppressed in the guise of declaring it as an illegal strike. Prior restraint is thus effectively made.

By no stretch of imagination, can a demonstration for about one hour on two occasions staged by dismissed employees be considered a strike, much more illegal? By definition of the Labor Code, it cannot be considered a strike as there is no “Temporary work stoppage,” the participants therein are no longer working as they have been dismissed and were excluded from actually returning to work by the company. (Art. 212 (o) of the Labor Code).

But even a finding that indeed the May 23 and 28 picket/mass action by the already dismissed employee and not actually working at the company was an illegal strike on ground of defiance of the cease and desist order, the remedy would have been perhaps a Motion to Cite them for Contempt before the office of the DOLE Secretary but not to declare it illegal strike.

Declaring it an illegal strike and mass dismissing the participants therein for mere participation in an illegal strike is simply not sanctioned by law. The fact that they were dismissed for mere participating in a picket protest on May 23 and 28, 2001 later declared illegal strike for defiance is clear in the October 19, 2007 decision and quote:

“Lastly, the strikers, though on payroll reinstatement, staged protest rallies on May 23, 2001 and May 28, 2001 in front of the Bicutan and Sta Rosa plants. These workers’ acts in joining and participating in the May 23 and 28, 2001 rallies or pickets were patent violations of the April 10, 2001 assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order issued by the DOLE Secretary, which proscribed the

commission of acts that might lead to the “worsening of an already deteriorated situation.” Art. 263 (g) is clear that strikers who violate the assumption/certification Order may suffer dismissal from work. This was the situation in the May 23 and 28, 2001 pickets and concerted actions, with the following employees who committed illegal acts:”

a. Strikers who joined the illegal pickets on May 23, 2001 were (1) Dennis Apolinario; (2) Abel Berces; (3) Benny Bering; (4) Dexter Bolanos; (5) Freddie Busano; (6) Ernesto Bustillo, Jr., (7) Randy Consignado; (8) Herbert Dalanon; (9) Leodegario De Silva; (10) Alexander Esteva; (11) Jason Fajilagutan; (12) Nikko Franco; (13) Genaro Gerola, Jr.; (14) Michael Gohilde; (15) Rogelio Magistrado; (16) Rolando Malaluan, Jr.; (17) Leoncio Malate, Jr.; (18) Edwin Manzanilla; (19) Nila Marcial; (20) Roderick Nierves; (21) Larry Ormilla; (22) Filemon Ortiz; (23) Cornelio Platon; (24) Alejandro Sampang; (25) Eric Santiago; (26) Romualdo Simborio; (27) Lauro Sulit; and (28) Rommel Tagala.

Pictures show the illegal acts (participation in pickets/strikes despite the issuance of a return-to-work order) committed by the aforelisted strikers.

b. Strikers who participated in the May 28, 2001 were (1) Joel Agosto; (2) Alex Alejo; (3) Erwin Alfonso; (4) Dennis Apolinario; (5) Melvin Apostol; (6) Rommel Arceta; (7) Lester Atun; (8) Abel Berces (9) Benny Bering; (10) Dexter Bolanos; (11) Marcelo Cabezas; (12) Nelson Leo Capate; (13) Lorenzo Caraqueo; (14) Christopher Catapusan; (15) Ricky Chavez; (16) Virgilio Colandog; (17) Claudio Correa; (18) Ed Cubelo; (19) Reynaldo Cuevas; (20) Rene Dalisay; (21) Benigno David, Jr.; (22) Alex Del Mundo; (23) Basilo Dela Cruz; (24) Roel Digma; (25) Aldrin Duyag; (26) Armando Ercillo; (27) Delmar Espadilla; (28) Alexander Esteva; (29) Nikko Franco; (30) Dexter Fulgar; (31) Dante Fulo; (32) Eduardo Gado; (33) Micahel Gohilde; (34) Eugene Jay Hondrada II; (35) Joey Javillonar; (36) Basilio Laqui; (37) Alberto Lomboy; (38) Geronimo Lopez; (39) Rommel Macalindog; (40) Nixon Madrazo; (41) Valentin Magbalita; (42) Allan John Malabanan; (43) Jonamar Manaog; (44) Bayani Manguil; (45) June Manigbas; (46) Alfred Manjares; (47) Edwin Manzanilla; (48) Mayo Mata; (49) Leo Ojenal; (50) Allan Oriana; (51) Rogelio Piamonte; (52) George Polutan; (53) Eric Santiago; (54) Bernabe Saquilabon; (55) Alex Sierra; (56) Romualdo Simborio; (57) Lauro Sulit; (58) Elvisanto Tabirao; (59) Edwin Tablizo; (60) Emmanuel Tulio; (61) Nestor Umiten; (62) Joseph Vargas; (63) Edwin Vergara; and (64) Michael Teddy Yangyon.

Toyota presented photographs which show said employees conducting mass pickets and concerted actions.” (emphasis supplied)

From the above findings of the Hon. Court, it is clear that those who participated in the May 23 and 28, 2001 mass action and later declared illegal strike for alleged defiance of the Order were dismissed on ground of their mere participation in an illegal strike.

NO CASE FOR ILLEGAL STRIKE FOR MAY 23 & 28, 201 RALLY ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ISSUES CERTIFIED TO COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

Equally important, is the fact that the about one hour demonstration of May 23 and 28, 2001 is not one of the issues certified to compulsory arbitration. The certification order specifically enumerated the issues or cases referred to the NLRC. It did not include these two incidents.

The Second Certification Order dated June 18, 2001 did not include any issue on strike allegedly staged on May 23 and 28, 2001.

No subsequent complaint for illegal strike was filed by the Respondent Company involving these May 23 and 28, 2001 incident. The Company’s June 12, 2001, Manifestation with Motion (To consider the Notice of Strike Subsumed) did not move that an alleged May 23 and 28, 2001 strike be included or subsumed in the certified case.

The Assailed decisions of the public respondent NLRC finding an illegal strike on May 23 and 28, 2001(as affirmed by the Assailed Decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals)- is an ultra vires act, way beyond the power of the NLRC acting on a certified case.

The NLRC jurisdiction is limited only to the issues certified to it. (PASVIL/Pascual Liner Inc. Worker Union –NAFLU versus National Labor Relations Commission, G. R. No. 124823, July 28, 1999 (Second Division) 311 SCRA 444. What was being sought by the company to be declared as illegal strike in its complaint for illegal strike was the strike staged from March 28 to April 12, 2001). This was not declared illegal, because it was a perfectly legal strike. The Company did not file a complaint for illegal strike on the February 21-23 incidents or May 23 and 28. The public respondent NLRC simply declared this as illegal strike and dismissed in mass 227 union officers and members.

This is the reason why the Assailed decision in declaring that there was an illegal strike alleged on May 23 and 28, 2001 did not and cannot cite even a single evidence to prove that indeed a strike was launched, who participated, how long was it staged and what was the reason for it.

It simply arbitrarily and whimsically declared that there was an illegal strike, in so grave an abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. If only to emphasize, the May 23 and 28 2001 one hour picket protest infront of the Toyota premises was not a strike at all. This was conducted by some of the dismissed employees. There was no work stoppage, as no one from the participants is actually working having been earlier dismissed and not actually reinstated. The Court on similar situation in the case of Balayan Colleges represented by Luis Lopez versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 101289, March 14, 1996, First Division, 255 SCRA 1, 13, the Court ruled:

“Balayan claims that this was tantamount to a strike. We disagree the teacher’s refusal to teach effective December 1, 1988 was merely on expression of protest at Balayan’s in action on their request for an adjustment of their hourly rate as part-time instructors. They were constrained to take such action only after Balayan was earlier informed that they could no longer accept teaching loads for the second semester at the rate of P 140.00 per hour.”

“Neither, can it also be considered that there was a deliberate refusal on the part of the teachers to resume their job as part-time instructors. They in fact resumed their functions as instructor on January 3, 1989, or a month after they informed the college authorities that they would drop their teaching load they were paid their salaries based on the old rate upon resumption of their positions as instructors, clearly indicating that they had no intention to abandon their jobs as instructors or department heads, for that matter.”

-II-

THE DISMISSAL OF SOME 218 UNION MEMBERS ON GROUND OF MERE PARTICIPATION IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE SUBVERTS EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The October 19, 2007 decision unmistakably found that the 218 ordinary union members out of 227 were participants of the February 22 & 23, 2001 rally at the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and which he Co9urt found later to be an illegal strike for alleged failure to conform with the requirement for the valid exercise of a strike.

THE ORDIANRY UNION MEMBERS WERE DISMSISED FOR PARTICIPATION ON THEFEBRUARY 22 AND 23 2001 RALLY AT THE blr WHICH WAS LATER DECLARED ILLEGAL STRIKE – NOT FOR COMMISSION OF ILLEGAL ACTS OR PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES DURING A STRIKE.

THE DISMISSAL OF THE 218 ORDINARY UNION MEMBERS FOR MERE PARTICIPATION IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE, IN A PROTEST RALLY EVEN IF LATER DECLARED “ILLEGAL STRIKE” IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL. IT IS WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE IN A STRING OF CASES THAT MERE PARTICIPATION OF ORDINARY UNION MEMBERS. [ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILS. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CENAPRO CHEMICALS, CORP., G. R. NO. 120505, MARCH 25, 1999 (THIRD DIVISION) 305 SCRA 219; GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE, INC (IN PORT) VS.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET. AL., G. R. NO. 103560, 103599, JULY 6, 1995 (THIRD DIVISION) 245 SCRA 627]. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PT&T), ET. AL. VERSUS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET. AL., G. R. N0. 109281, DECEMBER 7, 1995, (THIRD DIVISION) 251 SCRA 21.

IT IS THUS WELL SETTLED IN THIS JURISDICTION THAT MERE PARTICIPATION IN AN “ILLEGAL STRIKE” BY EMPLOYEES OR ORDINARY UNION MEMBERS IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.

The Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Association of Independent Unions in the Phils. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Cenapro Chemicals, Corp., G. R. No. 120505, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 219 ruled and quote:

“xxx It can be gleaned unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike (Gold City Integrated Port Services Inc. vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 627, 637) and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified.”

x x x

“For the severest administrative penalty of dismissal to attach, the erring strikers must be duly identified. Simply referring to them as “Strikers” “AIU Strikers”. Complainants in this case is not enough to justify their dismissal.”

x x x

The mere fact that the petitioners were not entirely “faultless” is of no moment. Such finding below does not adversely affect their entitlement to backwages”.

x x x

In an earlier case, the Hon. Supreme Court, in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. (INPORT) versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 103560, 103599, July 06, 1995, 245 SCRA 627, 641 ruled and quote:

“Applying the law (Article 264 of the Labor Code) which makes a distinction, we differentiate between the union members and the union officers among private respondents in granting the reliefs prayed for”.

Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost his employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union members committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal”.

The glaring error of law committed by the Hon. Court of Appeals is further exacerbated by the fact that at least two of the cases it cited in its assailed decision ruled that mere participation of union members in illegal strike is not a ground for dismissal. It is beyond reason how this principle of law was missed, it is respectfully submitted. The case of Allied Banking Corporation versus National Labor Relations Commission, Allied Banking Employees Union, et. al.,(First Division) 258 SCRA 725, cited in the Assailed decision, the Hon. Supreme Court categorically ruled and quote:

“We agree with respondents’ contention that mere participation of union members in an illegal strike should not automatically result in their termination from employment. x x x”

In the other case of Philippine Airlines versus Secretary of Labor and Employment, Franklin Drilon, et. al., (First Division) 193 SCRA 223 whereby the Supreme Court ruled and quote:

“Article 264. Prohibited Act …

x x x

“Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike maybe declared to have lost his employment status. Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.”

It is the singular act of mere participation by ordinary union members in an “illegal strike” that was erroneously found by the Court of appeals as a valid ground for mass dismissal of 218 ordinary union members, being allegedly violative of the Labor Code and the Code of Conduct of the Company provision on strikes and concerted actions, and further considering this act as serious misconduct.

What constitutes as serious misconduct and violation of the Code of Conduct of Toyota was the mere participation in an “illegal strike,” by ordinary union members. But mere participation in an illegal strike is not a ground for dismissal. This is a well settled doctrine in this jurisdiction.

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORPORATION’S MASS DISMISSAL OF 218 ORDINARY UNION MEMBERS FOR MERE PARTICIPATION IN AN ALLEGED “ILLEGAL STRIKE” WAS WITHOUT JUST CAUSE AND ILLEGAL. THE 218 ORDINARY UNIONMEMBERS MUST THEREFORE BE REINSTATED WITH FULL BACK WAGES AND ALL OTHER BENEFITS FROM DATE OF DISMISSAL UP TO ACTUAL DATE OF REINSTATEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 279 OF THE LABOR CODE.

“THE MERE FACT THAT THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT ENTIRELY “FAULTLESS” IS OF NO MOMENT. SUCH FINDING BELOW DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO BACKWAGES.” (Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines versus National Labor Relations Commission, Cenapro Chemicals, Corp., G. R. No. 120505, March 25, 1999 [Third Division] 305 SCRA 219).

It is doctrinal in this jurisdiction, that in the event of a finding that there is no cause for dismissal, the consequence of that is reinstatement to former position with full backwages, and other benefits from date of dismissal up to actual reinstatement. This is the law and it must be upheld in the case at bar. The law in Article 279 clearly provides that the employees dismissed without cause are entitled not only to

reinstatement but backwages from date of dismissal up to actual date of reinstatement, to include all other benefits or their monetary equivalent. Thus, the law provides in Article 279:

“An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.”

In the case of Pheschem Industrial Corporation, represented by its Manager, Wilfredo M. Sarmiento versus Pablito V. Moldez G.R. No. 161158, May 9, 2005 (Second Division) the Court ruled and the relevant portions are hereby quoted quote:

“….The legal consequences of an illegal dismissal are reinstatement of the employee without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and payment of his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent (Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Chrysler Philippines Labor Union, et.al., G.R. No. 148738, June 29, 2004.). Clearly, the law intended reinstatement to be the general rule….”

x x x

“On the issue of backwages, we reject the position of petitioner that its computation should be made only after the finality of the NLRC decision. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an illegally dismissed employee shall be entitled, inter alia, to the payment of his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him, i.e., from the time of his illegal dismissal, up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Thus, where

reinstatement is adjudged, the award of backwages and other benefits continues beyond the date of the labor arbiter’s decision ordering reinstatement and extends up to the time said order of reinstatement is actually carried out. (Rasonable v. NLRC, 253 SCRA 815 [1996])

The Court has expounded on the ratio decidendi in the case of City Trust Banking Corporation versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 104860, July 11, 1996 (Second Division) 258 SCRA 621, 632, ruled and quote:

“The Order to reinstate an employee to a former position or to a substantially equivalent position is a positive mandate of the law within which strict compliance is required. This is an affirmation that those deprived of a recognized protected interest should be made whole so that the employer will not profit from this misdeeds.”

-III-

FINDING THE UNION PRESIDENT AND 14 OTHER UNION OFFICERS AS HAVING LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT FOR HAVING PARTICIPATED IN ILLEGAL STRIKE ARE NULL AND VOID. THERE IS NO FINDING THAT THEY KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATED IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE OR THAT THEY COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS. THIS SUBVERTS THE WORKERS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW (ANG TIBAY VS. CIR).

KNOWING PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGAL STRIKE MUST BE PROVEN. There is no automatic termination of union officers even assuming (without admitting) that there is an illegal strike. There must be a showing or finding that the union officers “knowingly participated” in an illegal strike, OR that they committed illegal or prohibited acts.

There is no finding in the assailed decisions of the Hon. Court of Appeals against the union officers. What the assailed decisions did was simply to declare the strike illegal, and then proceeded to dismiss all union officers and 218 union members. Indeed, a clear travesty of justice. In the case of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T), et. al. versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. N0 109281, December 7, 1995, 251 SCRA 21, ruled and quote:

“…The Labor Code does at the same time hold accountable union officers who knowingly participated in an illegal strike. In the case at bar, no proof was adduced by petitioners that the May 1987 strikes violated the provision of Article 264 of the Labor Code which establish procedural criteria for determination of the legality of a strike; thus, there was no proof that private respondents who are union officers knowingly or in bad faith participated in an illegal strike.”

On the contrary, the Assailed decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals even found that the Union Officers (and members) acted in the honest belief that Management committed acts that are inimical to their interest, viz: “Violation of the duty to bargain collectively and illegal exercise of Management prerogative, and the right to strike is the only way by which they can air their grievance…” and that it is “unmarred by any form of violence” destruction of company properties or any untoward incident.

The Hon. Supreme Court had the occasion to rule in the case of PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 118223, June 26, 1998, First Division, (291 SCRA 231) that, a “Strike” staged in the belief in good faith that the company committed unfair labor practice acts against the union does not automatically make an illegal strike even in the absence of a Notice of Strike, violation of CBA, no strike clause and ban on strikes in export-oriented firms. The Court cited the landmark cases of Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Cement Workers Union (25 SCRA 504) and Ferrer vs. Court of Industrial Relations (117 SCRA 352).

The landmark ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court (this Division) in the case of Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG-UWP), its President Beda Magdalena Villanueva, Mario Dagani, et. al. versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 113907 dated February 28, 2000 (Third Division), 326 SCRA 428, 468-470, is worth to ponder for the relevant principles of law it declared, and quote:

“With regard to the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike, the Labor Arbiter held that the strike was illegal for the following reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-Union dispute which cannot properly be the subject of a strike, the right to strike being limited to cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) it was made in violation of the “no strike, no lock-out” clause in the CBA, and (3) it was attended with violence, force and intimidation upon the persons of the company officials, other employees reporting for work and third persons having legitimate business with the company, resulting to serious physical injuries to several employees and damage to company property.”

“On the submission that the strike was illegal for being grounded on a non-strikeable issue, that is, the intra-Union conflict between the federation and the local Union, it bears reiterating that when respondent company dismissed the Union officers, the issue was transformed into a termination dispute and brought respondent company into the picture. Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice in that it violated the petitioner’s right to self-organization. The strike was staged to protest respondent company’s act of dismissing the Union officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails.”

“Another reason why the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal is due to the existence of a no strike no lockout provision in the CBA. Again, such a ruling is erroneous. A no strike, no lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in nature, i.e. to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. Such a provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice, as was the honest belief of herein petitioners. Again, whether or not there was indeed unfair labor practice does not affect the strike.”

“On the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike, it must be remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that “the parties are agreed that there were violent incidents x x x

resulting to injuries to both sides, the Union and

management.” The evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management and the employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.”

“With respect to the dismissal of individual petitioners, the Labor Arbiter declared that their refusal to heed respondent’s recall to work notice is a clear indication that they were no longer interested in continuing their employment and is deemed abandonment. It is admitted that three return to work notices were sent by respondent company to the striking employees on March 27, April 11, and April 21, 1989 and that 261 employees who responded to the notice were admitted back to work.”

“However, jurisprudence holds that for abandonment of work to exists, it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. Deliberate and unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer.”

“In the present case, respondents failed to prove that there was a clear intention on the part of the striking employees to sever their employer-employee relationship. Although admittedly the company sent three return to work notices to them, it has not been substantially proven that these notices were actually sent and received by the employees. As a matter of fact, some employees deny that they ever received such notices. Others alleged that they were refused entry to the company premises by the security guards and were advised to secure a clearance from ULGWP and to sign a waiver. Some employees who responded to the notice were allegedly told to wait for further notice from respondent company as there was lack of work.”

“Furthermore, this Court has ruled that an employee who took steps to protest his lay-off cannot be said to have abandoned his work. The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the allegation of abandonment. In the case under consideration, the petitioners did, infact, file a complaint when they were refused reinstatement by respondent company.”

There is no finding, and nothing in the Assailed decisions of the Hon. Court of Appeals to show that any of the following union officers knowingly participated in illegal strike and committed prohibited acts: Ed Cubelo-President; Maximo Cruz; Vice-President; Joey Javillonar - Secretary; Lawrence Caraqueo – Treasurer; Joselito Hugo- Auditor; Emil Completo – Asst. Secretary; Ricky Chavez-Asst.Treasurer; Antonio Borsigue – Board Member; Mayo Mata – Board Member; Roderick Nierves – Board Member and Alex Esteva , Federico Torres, Jr., Bayani Manguil; Rommel Digma and Virgilio Colandog, Board Members.

Apparently, the Union officers were dismissed simply because they constitute the leadership. Obviously, the theory of vicarious liability was applied perhaps imprudently forgetting that this has been discarded by Philippine jurisprudence as enunciated in the land mark case of Benguet Consolidated versus Court of Industrial Relations, G. R. No. L-24711, April 30, 1968, (23 SCRA 465), where the Supreme Court ruled and quote:

“On the second question, it suffices to consider, in answer thereto, that the rule of vicarious liability has, since the passage of Republic Act 875, been expressly legislated out. The standing rule now is that for a labor Union and/or its officials and members to be liable, there must be clear proof of actual participation in, or authorization or ratification of the illegal acts.”

UNION OFFICERS DID NOT

COMMIT ANY ILLEGAL ACT

The Assailed decisions did not find any single union officer from the President down as having committed illegal or prohibited acts during the incidents of February 22 and 23, 2001, as well as on May 23 and 28, 2001.

The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals found the “strike” to be “unmarred by any form of violence, destruction of company properties, or any untoward incident …” (page 3, last paragraph, Court of Appeals June 20, 2003 decision).

The Assailed decisions did not find, and as well as the records of the case is bereft of any evidence to show that the 15 union officers knowingly participated in an illegal strike on February 22 & 23, 2001. Not a single union officer was named and pinpointed as having committed prohibited acts during the strike.

As a matter of fact, the union President Ed Cubelo was not among those dismissed by the Company for illegal strike, as well as 5 other union officers, Maximo Cruz, Union Vice-President; Virgilio Colandog, Union Board Member; Ricky Chavez, Asst. Treasurer; Joselito B. Hugo, Auditor and Romel Digma, Member of the Board, who continue to actually report for work after the February 22 & 23, 2001 demonstration at the Bureau of Labor Relations, and even after the strike stage from March 28 to April 12, 2007: They were not given any show cause letter to explain the an alleged illegal strike on February 22 & 23, 2001 or even the March 28 to April 12 2001 strike.

This is so because they were present and attended the hearings before the Bureau of Labor Relations on February 22 & 23, 2001.

In the case of International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 98295-99, First Division, April 10, 1996, (256 SCRA 124,134-135) ruled and quote:

“x x x

Under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, it is clearly stated therein that any Union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or Union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.

As aptly stated by the Solicitor General:

x x x

In the case at bench, there is nothing in the records which show that private respondent Paano and the 20 others expressly admitted that they are the leaders of the strike.

x x x

Furthermore, petitioner did not present evidence that respondents were agitating, cajoling or leading others to join the strike. We can only conclude that at the very least, they were merely members of the Union. The act of private respondents in failing to heed the order of their superior from joining the picket line is only tantamount to insubordination which cannot be considered as an illegal or unlawful act committed during the strike or justify their dismissal from employment”.

Thus, all of the Union Officers dismissed must be reinstated with full backwages from date of dismissal up to actual date of reinstatement in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code for having been dismissed without just cause.

-IV-

THE UNION FILED ITS POSITION PAPER AND IT FILED ON TIME BY MAIL (VIOLATION OF ANG TIBAY VS. CIR).

With due respect and contrary to the Hon. Court’s finding, and as per record, the union filed its position paper on time as required on August 3, 2001.

The Union filed its Position Paper by mail as per record on August 3, 2001, Friday. It was filed by mail at about 5:00 p.m. at the Central Post Office, Manila, right after it was finished. There was obviously no more time to file it personally before the Commission considering the distance from Manila to Banawe, Quezon City.

The Commission is aware of this as a “Manifestation of Filing by Mail of Union’s Position Paper” was filed the following Monday August 6, 2001, as evidenced by the stamped received of the Commission. [Annexes “J” to “J-1”, of the Petition for Review on Certiorari]. Filing of pleadings by mail is perfectly legal and not dilatory. This is allowed by the Rules.

The date of filing of the pleading by mail is considered the date it is filed.The Supreme Court in the case of Associated Anglo – American Tobacco Corporation versus National Labor Relations Commission, G. R. No. 125602, April 29, 1999 (Second Division) 306 SCRA 380, 386, ruled and quote:

“Petitioner’s Notice with Memorandum on Appeal” was sent by registered mail to the Regional Arbitration Branch No. II on 8 March 1996. The front and back portions of the envelope thereof and the corresponding registry

receipt show the post office stamp that it was mailed on said date. The Regional Arbitration Branch No. II received it on March 14, 1996. It was the latter date which the NLRC seemed to have regarded as the date of filing. This is error under Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the date of filing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt is considered the date of filing in Court, which is in the present case was 8 March 1996.”

The Position Paper was mailed for simply lack of time. The Commission gave the union until August 3, 2001 to file its Position Papers, the Order, however, was served only 7 days before the deadline [please see Annex “I” to “I-1”, of the Petition for Certiorari, July 19, 2001 Order of the NLRC].

The Hon. Commission was hellbent on rushing a decision in the instant case designed to placate and appease Japanese investors who threatened government earlier in a much publisized threat to pull out its investment if “they were not protected from strikes, which read between the lines simply means that the Toyota Strikers must be punished.

The Commission thus, taking its cue and at the expense of due process of law rushed its decision and, declared the strike illegal. This is the reason why the Secretary of Trade first learned of the decision declaring the strike illegal much earlier than the union, and its Counsel. It appears that a report was made earlier, that is why he was able to make the press statement that he is happy that the strike was declared illegal, not knowing the consequences of this act.

Moreover, the Hon. Commission’s assailed decision is null and void. It was issued while several motions were still pending and unacted upon before the Commission, such as the Motion to Recuse (inhibition) was unacted upon.

This was filed on July 17, 2001 (a clear copy of it is [Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Recuse] appended as Annexes “H” to “H-3”, of the Petition for Review on Certiorari).

This Motion for Recuse was reiterated in a “Motion for Immediate Resolution of the Union’s Motion for Recuse,” filed on July 27, 2001 (please see Annexes “L” to “L-1”, of the Petition for Review on Certiorari) also pending was the Union’s “Motion for an Order Requiring the Respondents Company to Furnish Union Copy of its Position Paper” (Annex “K”, of the Petition for Review on Certiorari) so that it could file a Reply, filed before the Commission on August 6, 2001, also pending is the Motion for a Trial on the Merits as embodied in the Position Paper.

The Commission has not issued any order resolving these pending motions. It has not issued an order considering the case submitted for Decision. (Rodrigo G. Habana versus National Labor Relations Commission, G. R. No. 129418, September 10, 1999 (Second Division) 314 SCRA 187. All it did was to issue a threat that if no Position Paper is submitted by August 3, 2001, the case will be decided on the basis of the Position Paper of the Company. A Position Paper, however, was filed on this date by mail.

-V-

THE DECISION OF THE NLRC IN NOT FINDING THAT THE MASS DISMISSAL OF SOME 227 UNION OFFICERS AND MEMBERS AND DISCRIMINATORY ACTS AGAINST UNION MEMBERS CONSTITUTE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AND NO OTHER

The respondents thus intended to bust the union and interfered with the workers’ right to self-organization and manage their own affairs when it did the following: Dismissed the union leadership from the Union President down to the shop stewards and 218 members, consisting of some 227 workers, AND HAVE VIRTUALLY DESTROYED THE BACKBONE OF THE UNION. It is busted. This is the clear intention of the respondent Toyota (TMPC).

The mass dismissal of 227 Union Officers and members was the decisive weapon used by the Company to destroy the Union and frustrate the desire of the workers at Toyota to be unionized, and have a Collective Bargaining Agreement. It should be emphasized that the most obdurate opposition to the establishment of the union, petition for certification election and until now, is being lodged by the respondent Toyota (TMPC).

It opposed the formation of the Union when it filed as Petition for cancellation of union registration. It opposed the conduct of a certification election up to the level of the Court of Appeals. Up to the present it refused to recognize the Union TMPCWA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent despite the order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment being final and executory, such refusal constituting unfair labor practice or refusal to bargain.

They continue to refuse to negotiate a CBA with the Union despite the Supreme Court decision (G. R. No. 148924, Second Division) annulling the preliminary Injunction issued by the Court of Appeals which earlier enjoined the decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment declaring the TMPCWA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees.

Thus, the admonition of then Labor Minister Blas Ople in his sponsorship of then parliamentary Bill No. 386 (Unfair Labor Practice Act) in the explanatory note continue to haunt and reverberate and quote:

“Emboldened by the law’s liberality nay, inadequacy, irresponsible, sometimes vindicative employers, many of them aliens , ride high brazenly committing such unfair labor practices . Legitimate unions and labor organizations, most especially the weak and the newly organized, easily get busted with impunity, harassed or discriminated against , terms and conditions of employment retrogressing to sub-standard level standard level instead of improving all on account of the lack of effective deterrents to and penal sanctions against such pernicious practices.

The Court’s ruling in the case of Judric Canning Corporation versus Inciong, 115 SCRA 887, 890, 891, by analogy is relevant and quote:

“The contention is without merit. Under Article 248 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in their exercise of the right to self-organization is unfair labor practice on the part of the employer. Paragraph (d) of said Article also considers it an unfair labor practice for an employer to initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation of administration of any labor organization including the giving of financial or other support to it. In this particular case, the private respondents were dismissed, or their services were terminated, because they were soliciting signatures in order to form a union within the plant . . .”

The Court in the case of Visayan Bicycle Manufacturing Co. Inc. versus National Labor Union, 14 SCRA 6, ruled and quote:

“x x x it can be established that the true and basic inspiration for the employer’s act is derived from the employee’s union affiliations or activities, the assignment by the employer or another reason, whatever its semblance of validity, is unavailing. Thus, it has been held that the facts disclosed that the employer’s act in discharging employees were actually prompted by the employer’s improper interest in the affected employee’s union affiliation and activities, even though the employer urged that his acts were predicated on economic necessity.

Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of Union of Filipino Workers (UFW) versus National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G. R. No. 90519, March 12, 1992, Second Division, (207 SCRA 435,443) ruled and quote:

x x x

“These factors strongly give more credence to the Solicitor General and UFW’s contention that the alleged closure of business of SIMEX was “but a subterfuge to discourage formation of a union and that SIMEX was guilty of union busting. To all appearances, the company had filed a Notice of Closure simply to preempt the employees from forming a Union within the company.”

DISCRIMINATION ON BONUSES/HARASSMENT

The Strikers were discriminated upon because of union activities, and were not give a one month bonus. Only those who stayed away from the strike were given bonus.

Thus, this unfair labor practice act is arrogantly admitted by the Company in its Memorandum posted in the Bulletin Board, ruled and quote:

“April 3, 2001

TO : ALL CONCERNED TEAM MEMBERS

FROM : THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT : TMP’S APPRECIATION FOR TEAM MEMBERS’ SUPPORT DURING THE ILLEGAL STRIKE AND BARRICADE

In behalf of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for your display of unwavering commitment and loyalty in this time of crisis. Once again, you have shown what true Toyota Team Members are made of: strength in character, a sense of fairness, the ability to take up challenges, and the willingness to sacrifice personal gain for the good of the organization.

I take great pride to have you as Toyota Team Members.

As a concrete manifestation of TMP’s thanks, we shall be awarding special cash incentives to all those who have shown dedication and continue to be one with the Company during this crisis.

We trust that you will continue to work with Management as we rebuild TMP and face the many challenges that lie ahead.

(TAKESHI FUKUDA”, Memorandum dated April 3, 2001)

Again, this was repeated when the company practice of giving a one month Mid-year (bonus every June of the year, given always every last week of May) was not extended to the strikers. Only non-strikers were given in a clear discriminatory act constituting unfair labor practice acts.

P R A Y E R

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the assailed October 19, 2007 decision be set-aside and a new judgment be rendered ordering for the immediate reinstatement of all dismissed union members who have not accepted separation pay/financial assistance, now numbering only some 120 union members and (15) Union officers with full back wages and all other benefits plus 6% interest from date of dismissal up to actual date of reinstatement as provided for in Article 279 of the Labor Code (from the original 227 dismissed employees); and nullification of the suspension of 64 union members with full payment of the 30 days suspension as the case maybe.

Further finding that respondents Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. and its named officers herein guilty of unfair labor practice, and their subsequent prosecution. Award of 10% of the total monetary award as Attorney’s fees.

And such other relief as are equitable under the premises.

Manila. November 23, 2007.

SIGNED

ED CUBELO

Union President

SIGNED

ATTY. CEZAR F. MARAVILLA, JR.

218 Natividad Building

Escolta, Manila

Attorneys’ Roll No. 31273

(IBP) Life Member Roll No. 06552 – 3/29/2007

PTR NO. MLA.5309830–1/3/2007

M a n i l a

Copy furnished:

1. DELA ROSA TEJERO NOGRALES

Counsel for Petitioner

22^nd Floor, Philippine Stock Exchange Centre

West Tower, Exchange Road

Ortigas Center, Pasig City

2. The Solicitor General

(CA- G.R. SP. NO. 67561 & NO. 67100)

(NLRC- NCR- CERTIFIED CASE NO. 000203-01)

134 Amorsolo Street

Makati City

3. The Court of Appeals

Former Third Division

CA-G.R. SP. NO. 67561 & NO. 67100)

(CONSOLIDATED CASES)

Ma. Orosa Street, Ermita

1000 Manila

EXPLANATION

Pursuant to Sec. 11 of the Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is respectfully explained that service of “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER THAT THIS BE RESOLVED BY THE HON. SUPREME COURT EN BANC,” on the other Counsels/Parties, of this case were made by Registered Mails instead of the personal service. The law office does not have process server at the moment who will attend to all the service/messengerial requirements in the office.

SIGNED

ATTY. CEZAR F. MARAVILLA, JR.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )

CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.

AFFIDAVIT OF

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, ED CUBELO, of legal age, married and a resident of Makati City, under oath hereby depose and state:

1. That, I am the Union President and one of the Petitioners in the case TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORPORATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA) VERSUS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), ET. AL., Consolidated G. R. NOS. 158786 - 158789 and G.R. Nos. 158798-99;

2. That, I caused the instant “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER THAT THIS BE RESOLVED BY THE HON. SUPREME COURT EN BANC”, copies of the said pleading to be served by having them mailed to the following:

1. DELA ROSA TEJERO NOGRALES

Counsel for Petitioner

22^nd Floor, Philippine Stock Exchange Centre

West Tower, Exchange Road

Ortigas Center, Pasig City

Registered mail O. R. No. ___________

Posted at Central Post Office, Manila

Dated Posted _____________________

2. The Solicitor General

134 Amorsolo Street

Makati City

Registered mail O. R. No. ___________